China’s Presence in Africa

Introduction

China's¹ economic and political presence in Africa has drawn increasing international attention in recent years. Rarely referred to till recently except in academic journals and international periodicals specializing in African and Asian issues, the implications of China's presence are now widely discussed in the leading national newspapers of most countries.

Stands on this issue vary greatly according to the point of view from which they evolve. Articles and studies from the United States and Europe are more concerned with the possible repercussions of recent Chinese activity in Africa on American and European companies already operating in these markets, and also with the extent of Western political influence in many African countries. Studies from research centres in Asia see the matter in a different light - what opportunities will open up for China as a result of this partnership with African states? Obviously, the position is different again from the perspective of African observers. They reflect on the consequences ensuing to their own countries of cooperation with China. At bottom their question is: Will this new international partnership be "a blessing or a curse"² for Africa?

In this article we propose to illustrate the current state of Sino-African relationships, briefly reviewing the salient features of this development and looking briefly at how the situation may evolve in the near future. In doing this we will seek to examine the situation from an African context.

The recent past and present of Sino-Africa cooperation

 From the end of Western colonialism in Africa in the 60s up until the 90s, relations between China and African nations were essentially diplomatic. China, emerging on the international political scene, turned to African countries for support in its role both as a global political actor and as a knight in shining armour come to defend the rights and interests of non-aligned developing countries.³

This consolidated relationship underwent a profound change in the nineties due to a number of external factors. First, the Cold War ended and the systematic division of the world into two blocs collapsed. Then, in 1992 communist China set in motion a complete and previously unimaginable transformation of its economic system into a 'socialist market system', that is, an economy governed by the rules of capitalism but strictly controlled at the same time by the government. The changing international context and China's choices governed by internal economic policies provided a greater impulse than could ever have been estimated to economic growth in that country over the last two decades. The sustained rhythm of this growth and the fact of an annual growth close to, or even over, ten percent makes the middle kingdom an extraordinary world economy that reached very high levels in record time.

One of its most remarkable aspects was the economic opening of the country to the rest of the world. China is no longer off-limits to foreign businesses; instead, it has become one of the countries attracting the most consistent quota of foreign investment. At the same time, Chinese companies turned to foreign markets to sell their own products, to source the raw materials they needed, and to make industrial and business investments.

It is in this context that we must place China's renewed interest in African countries.⁴ To understand the new Chinese policy of cooperation with African countries, we need to start with the foreign policy proposal based on the "Five principles of peaceful coexistence" launched in 1996 by the then president Jiang Zemin. Shaping Chinese policy in Africa during the years that followed, it was consolidated as a formal government paper entitled China's African Policy, published 12 January 2006, and sets out the guidelines for this south-south cooperation.⁵ The five points on which the proposal is based are: mutual friendship, cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, promotion of mutual development and respect (win-win), non-interference in each other's internal affairs and peaceful coexistence.

Chinese politicians present themselves to their African counterparts as proposing cooperation based on mutual advantage without any further clause or condition of a political nature, as often happens with Western governments. The actual fact is that this Chinese claim of Sino-African cooperation based purely on mutual advantage does not hold true in all cases; there are significant exceptions. This policy of cooperation has been accurately presented to African leaders through a highly organised and impressive diplomatic campaign, including numerous visits to Africa⁶ by leading Chinese authorities and the setting up of institutional contacts through the newly formed Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC.⁷ A new China-Africa summit was held for the first time in Beijing in December 2006 with the participation of representatives from 48 African nations. Chinese diplomatic activity goes hand in hand with the adoption of economic and commercial initiatives. Every visit or international meeting is generally accompanied by the signing of important business contracts ensuring Chinese access to African raw materials and markets in exchange for transport and service, infrastructure construction and significant investments.⁸ The motivation for this pro-active foreign policy contains many interrelated elements and cannot be viewed simplistically.

Raw materials

The most obvious Chinese interest in Africa is the need for secure access to the raw materials abundant in Africa. Without adequate natural resources (oil, nickel, copper, cobalt, iron, wood ...) to meet its needs in sustaining the rhythm of growth, China has been obliged to find them abroad. To begin with, the country turned to Asian markets; since early 2000 however attention has concentrated on African countries.

Behind this very specific choice there are both economic and political reasons. From an economic standpoint, all observers agree that Chinese dependence on the import of raw materials, particularly energy needs, above all, oil, is bound to increase in time. From a political standpoint this need makes China vulnerable, requiring it to increase the number of countries from which to import the crucial raw materials and not rely on limited sources abroad.⁹ It is no coincidence that Chinese President Hu Jintao, commenting on the latest five year plan (2007-2011), insists on the need to change the orientation of the Chinese economy - no longer emphasising rapid economic growth but expansion based on quality and efficiency.

This is why countries in the Gulf of Guinea, Sudan, Algeria and Angola have become particularly important partners for China, which has sought collaboration with them, offering them agreements that are economically far more advantageous compared with those proposed by Western companies, and promoting several forms of cooperation for development. With regard to cooperation policies - which extend to almost all African nations and are not limited to countries rich in raw materials - the Chinese government has adopted a number of important decisions, such as cancellation of foreign debt, loans on very favourable terms, and construction of transport, infrastructure, public facilities such as hospitals, and prestigious buildings at their own cost. Examples of these are the railway line between Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Foreign Ministry in Uganda, and Parliament buildings in Gabon and Mozambique. Other forms of cooperation worth mentioning are the flow of technicians, engineers and doctors and the sharing of technologies and production techniques. A recent innovation is the presence in the continent of Chinese peacekeeping troops (in Liberia and Congo in 2003).¹⁰

In keeping with the principles of international cooperation, China states it maintains a neutral stand and does not intervene in internal political issues as Western governments do. The reality is somewhat different. China does not hesitate to use its influence at the international level to protect and sustain some of the most heavily criticised governments in the continent for their dismal record of respect for human rights and democracy. The case of Darfur, considered an internal issue in Sudan by the Chinese authorities for a long time,¹¹ is the most flagrant instance of this.

Other aspects - political collaboration and access to African markets

In actual fact, the cooperation proposed by China is not wholly unconditional given certain choices made by Chinese authorities relative to international relations with African countries. From a political standpoint China's foreign policy insists on the so-called "principle of one China," in other words, requiring the international community not to recognise the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a state but to support instead the PRC claim to these territories. The continual and prolonged diplomatic commitment of the PRC in Africa, a land hotly disputed between the two governments of the PRC and Taiwan, has produced notable results over the years as countless African countries have progressively cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Today Taiwan is recognised by only four out of 53 African nations. These four are Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe.¹²

Two factors are important from an economic point of view. First, most of the companies involved in carrying out the construction work financed by these contracts in African countries are Chinese.

Next, these agreements encourage the growth of Chinese companies in the African market, which, despite not being particularly rich, is still attractive, especially for the textile industry and manufactured goods with a high added value. Early in 2000 the Chinese authorities set themselves a goal of trade worth 100 million dollars by 2009, an objective that was in fact reached and exceeded in 2008,¹³ a year ahead of schedule.

In both cases there have been great repercussions for economies in African countries. Chinese businesses generally tend to employ migrant Chinese workers, without drawing on the local labour force. At the same time, African industry is penalised and swept away by the market for Chinese products famed for their low cost and reasonable quality. The result is an obstacle to overall growth in the African economic system. Both advanced technological products and products with a low added value are effectively damaged in this way.

Another source of concern identified by observers is the nature of the trade portfolio between China and Africa. Africa essentially exports raw materials to China and imports Chinese products. This trend has been consistently reinforced over a 20-year period and the consequences are evident in the decisively negative trade balance of African countries. Some commentators have gone so far as to say that "China has created a situation of practically colonial exploitation in Africa."¹⁴ The situation varies from country to country, it is true, but at least two thirds of the countries in Africa are facing the same deficit situation. The economy in African countries is increasingly based on mining activities, which provide little guarantee of lasting and widespread growth for the future.

Conclusion

The initial question posed by African leaders on the nature of relations with China is still open following this brief review. Certainly a number of African countries are benefiting in the short term from the Chinese economic and political presence in Africa, a benefit which will be all the more considerable when China declares she does not intend to alter her plans despite the recent financial crisis.¹⁵ At the same time, it is fundamental for the African political class to succeed in translating this process into positive effects in the long term, obtaining maximum benefit from this economic and political relationship in order to build something that will last.

¹In the article the word China refers to the People's Republic of China.

²These words were used by Amos Kimunya, Kenyan Finance Minister, in 2007 at the first African Development Bank meeting held in Asia, in Shanghai. This concern surfaces not only in comments made by politicians but also in academic publications. Cf. Germain Ngoie Tshimbambe and Constant Kabika Etobo, "Les relations sino-africaines: Entre l'espoir et le controverses" ("Sino-African relations: between hope and controversy ") in Congo-Afrique XLVII (September 2007) no. 417, 599-620.

³Cf. Michal Meidan, "China's Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later," Asian Perspective, vol. 30, no 4, 2006, 72-76.

⁴Despite the undeniable fact that economic cooperation between China and African countries has led to a phase of growth, it is still lower than the levels generated by cooperation between Asian countries. For instance, the total volume of Sino-African trade in 2007 amounted to approximately one third of that between China and Korea.

⁵For the English text cf: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html

⁶The last visit, made by Chinese President Hu Jintao, was in February 2009, to four African countries (Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius).

⁷Up until now there have only been two sessions of this Forum. The first was held in Beijing in 2000, the second in Addis Ababa in 2003.

⁸For example, 16 business contracts were signed at the 2006 summit between 12 Chinese companies and ten African countries for a total of 1.9 billion dollars. With regard to infrastructure, a new railway line was built between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, and the Tanzara line between Zambia and Tanzania was modernised.

⁹This is particularly evident for the oil of which China is currently the third major importer in the world. With a domestic demand for oil in constant growth, China has tried in the last ten years to reduce imports from the Middle East in favor of other markets, especially in Africa. The model adopted by China is focused on long-term ties with producer countries, in which the Chinese national oil companies operate directly (vertical integration).

¹⁰For a detailed review with specific country references cf Michal Meidan, op. cit., 78-85. The author also cites China's involvement in providing arms to African states.

¹¹Much criticism has been levelled against the Chinese authorities by Western governments for the policy of non-interference adopted by China regarding human rights in some African states.

¹²The latest country to break off diplomatic ties with Taiwan was Malawi in January 2008. The Taiwanese authorities stated that this change in diplomatic relations was preceded by the concession of a six billion dollar loan.

¹³Early in 2009 the Chinese Trade Minister stated that business between China and African countries in 2008 was equivalent to 106.8 billion dollars.

¹⁴Cfr. Germain Ngoie Tshimbambe e Constant Kabika Etobo, op. cit., 614.

¹⁵Commenting on the recent trip to Africa by President Hu Jintao, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun said that China will honour the commitment made to support the development of African countries and will continue to encourage Chinese companies to invest and create business in Africa." In particular, China has planned an increase of 200% of aid to Africa compared to 2006 and created a fund of 1 million dollars to boost investment in Africa of Chinese companies.